That moment when you have a flight and already carry a book to read, but you pass in front of a bookstore and enter anyway. I ended up buying this book, "The Next Decade", by George Friedman. I had already read his best-seller "The Next 100 years", where he attempts to forecast the major events of the 21st century. The thought of a space-based war between the United States and by then global powers Poland and Turkey sounds far fetched, especially when he throws in a futuristic version of Pearl Harbor, with Japan launching a stealth missile attack from the far side of the Moon. However, other things sound more sensible, such as China eventually going unstable, or Russia trying to regain its sphere of influence; and alarming NATO in the process. Star Wars aside, it made for an interesting reading in geopolitics. So, I bought this new book.
A chapter in particular dealt with the Americas. The text below is what he has to say about Brazil. Possible control of the South Atlantic by 2030, and advice that the US should play divide and conquer by sponsoring Argentina to prevent the unchecked rise of a local hegemon.
Expert foresight or imperial paranoia?
Given that he misspells São Paulo twice (Sao Paolo), I assume he doesn't know much about Brazil. It's no secret that Brazilian aspirations are modest, consisting of "Sun Sea and Samba" (a slogan that could replace that old-fashioned flag motto). The Machiavellian analysis also fails to realize that Brazilians do not aspire to world domination. As far as international relations go, we're content about being the world's soccer kings, as well as the leading export of elevator music (though both of these have seen better days). But more importantly, Brazilian society has a deep mistrust of its military, that has many times interfered in domestic politics, most recently in the 1964 coup d'état, and the long 20 years of blood-stained military dictatorship that followed. It is possible that a future military triumph may redeem the Army in Brazilian eyes, but given Brazil's nonbelligerence and South America's relative unimportance in international affairs, that scenario is most unlikely. More probable, paraphrasing a famous quote, the century will pass and still the Army's guilt will not have been erased.
But more important, and unfortunate, is the tribalism of the text. Tribal loyalty may be deeply wired in our genes, and it may have served a valuable purpose for our early survival as a species. But it should be an anachronistic trait in what we would like to consider to be post-enlightenment times. It contributes to a dark side in international politics, coming from one of the worst pits of human condition, its willingness to invent divisions and to believe in them.
Edgar Mitchell, an astronaut in the Apollo 14 mission, also voiced a revolt against tribalism when, looking back to Earth from the surface of the moon, realized that "you develop an instant global consciousness, a people orientation, an intense dissatisfaction with the state of the world, and a compulsion to do something about it". He goes on to state that "from out there on the Moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, you son of a bitch.’"
So, brilliant geopolitical inferences or foolish Texan Nostradamusianisms aside, Friedman's Sauron eye may provide a valuable service to the Empire, but it is at the flip side a serious de-service to humanity. May Argentina and Brazil never have a thing to quarrel about militarily. And may all countries realize, like Edgar Mitchell did from his vantage point on the surface of the Moon, how the very notion of the nation-state is obsolete and inherently tribal. That independently of where by sheer chance we happen to be born, and no matter how different our cultures may make us appear on the surface, that we all share a bond as members of the same species. Bypassing such tribalism should be one of the main goals of a future world government.
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"There is only one Latin American country with the potential to emerge as a competitor to the United States on its own right, and that is Brazil. It is the first significant, independent economic and potentially global power to develop in the history of Latin America, and it has hedged is bets nicely.
Brazil is the world's sixth largest economy and the fifth largest country both in size and in population. Like most developing countries, it is heavily oriented toward export, but its exports are well balanced. Two-thirds are primary commodities (agricultural and mineral) and the rest are manufactured products. The geographic distribution to its exports is impressive as well, with about equal amounts going to Latin America, the European Union, and Asia. A relatively small but not insignificant amount goes to the United States. This balanced export posture means that Brazil is less vulnerable to regional economic downturns than are more focused economies.
Right now Brazil is not a power that is particularly threatening or important to the United States, nor does the United States represent a challenge to Brazil. There is minimal economic friction, and geography prevents Brazil from easily challenging the United States. Brazilian expansion northward would be irrational, because the terrain to the north is extremely hard to traverse, and there is nothing to the north Brazil needs. Venezuelan oil, for instance, cannot be easily shipped to Brazil because of the terrain, and Brazil has ample supplies of its own anyway.
The only challenge that Brazil could pose to the United States would be if its economic expansion continued enough for it to develop sufficient air and naval power to dominate the Atlantic between its coast and West Africa, a region not heavily patrolled by the United States, unlike the Indian Ocean or South China Sea. This would not happen in the next decade, but as Brazilian wage rates rise, the geographical factors are such that Brazilian investments in Africa might carry lower transportation costs than investments in other parts of Latin America. Thus there would be advantages for Brazil in developing relations with sub-Saharan countries, particularly Angola, which, like Brazil, is Portuguese-speaking. This could lead to a South Atlantic not only dominated by Brazil but with Brazilian naval forces on both the Brazilian and the African coasts.
Even though Brazil is not yet in any way a threat to American interests, the underlying American strategy of creating and maintaining balances of power in all areas requires that the United States begin working now to create a countervailing power. There is no rush in completing the strategy, but there is an interest in beginning it.
In the next decade, while maintaining friendly relations with Brazil the United States should also do everything it can to strengthen Argentina, the one country that could serve as a counterweight. It should be remembered that early in the twentieth century Argentina was the major power in Latin America. Its current weakness is not inevitable. The United States should work toward developing a special relationship with Argentina in the context of a general Latin American development plan that also includes resources devoted to Uruguay and Paraguay.
This is a region where modest amounts of money now can yield substantial benefits later. Argentina's geography is suited for development; it has an adequate population and room for still more people. It has a strong agricultural base and a workforce capable of developing an industrial base. It is protected from all military incursions except those from Brazil, which should give it an incentive to play the role that the United States wants it to play.
The challenge in Argentina is political. Historically, its central government has been focused on addressing social problems in ways that actually undermine economic development. In other words, politicians tend to gain popularity by spending money they don't have. Argentina has also gone through periods of military and other dictatorships with imposed austerity, a cycle in which it does not differ fundamentally from other Latin American countries including Brazil.
The Brazilians will see a long-term threat in U.S. support for Argentina, but ideally they will be preoccupied with their own development and the internal stresses it generates, Nevertheless, the United States should be prepared for the Brazilians to offer Argentina economic incentives that would tie its economy closer to their own. Still, two factors play in the Americans' favor. First, Brazil still needs to preserve its investment capital for domestic use. Second, Argentina has long feared Brazilian dominance, so given a choice between Brazil and the United States, it will opt for the latter.
The American goal should be to slowly strengthen Argentina's economic and political capabilities so that over the next twenty to thirty years, should Brazil begin to emerge as a potential threat to the United States, Argentina's growth rivals Brazil's. This will require the United States to provide incentives for American companies to invest in Argentina, particularly in areas outside of agricultural products, where there is already sufficient investment. The United States also should be prepared to draw the American military closer to the Argentine military, but through the civilian government, so as not to incite fears that the U.S. is favoring the Argentine military as a force in the country's domestic politics.
The American president must be careful not to show his true intentions in this, and not to rush. A unique program for Argentina could generate a premature Brazilian response, so Brazil should be included in any American program, if it wishes to participate. If necessary, this entire goodwill effort can be presented as an attempt to contain Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It will all cost money, but it will be much cheaper, in every sense, than confronting Brazil in the 2030s or 2040s over control of the South Atlantic."
- George Friedman, The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World.
A chapter in particular dealt with the Americas. The text below is what he has to say about Brazil. Possible control of the South Atlantic by 2030, and advice that the US should play divide and conquer by sponsoring Argentina to prevent the unchecked rise of a local hegemon.
Expert foresight or imperial paranoia?
Given that he misspells São Paulo twice (Sao Paolo), I assume he doesn't know much about Brazil. It's no secret that Brazilian aspirations are modest, consisting of "Sun Sea and Samba" (a slogan that could replace that old-fashioned flag motto). The Machiavellian analysis also fails to realize that Brazilians do not aspire to world domination. As far as international relations go, we're content about being the world's soccer kings, as well as the leading export of elevator music (though both of these have seen better days). But more importantly, Brazilian society has a deep mistrust of its military, that has many times interfered in domestic politics, most recently in the 1964 coup d'état, and the long 20 years of blood-stained military dictatorship that followed. It is possible that a future military triumph may redeem the Army in Brazilian eyes, but given Brazil's nonbelligerence and South America's relative unimportance in international affairs, that scenario is most unlikely. More probable, paraphrasing a famous quote, the century will pass and still the Army's guilt will not have been erased.
But more important, and unfortunate, is the tribalism of the text. Tribal loyalty may be deeply wired in our genes, and it may have served a valuable purpose for our early survival as a species. But it should be an anachronistic trait in what we would like to consider to be post-enlightenment times. It contributes to a dark side in international politics, coming from one of the worst pits of human condition, its willingness to invent divisions and to believe in them.
Edgar Mitchell, an astronaut in the Apollo 14 mission, also voiced a revolt against tribalism when, looking back to Earth from the surface of the moon, realized that "you develop an instant global consciousness, a people orientation, an intense dissatisfaction with the state of the world, and a compulsion to do something about it". He goes on to state that "from out there on the Moon, international politics look so petty. You want to grab a politician by the scruff of the neck and drag him a quarter of a million miles out and say, ‘Look at that, you son of a bitch.’"
So, brilliant geopolitical inferences or foolish Texan Nostradamusianisms aside, Friedman's Sauron eye may provide a valuable service to the Empire, but it is at the flip side a serious de-service to humanity. May Argentina and Brazil never have a thing to quarrel about militarily. And may all countries realize, like Edgar Mitchell did from his vantage point on the surface of the Moon, how the very notion of the nation-state is obsolete and inherently tribal. That independently of where by sheer chance we happen to be born, and no matter how different our cultures may make us appear on the surface, that we all share a bond as members of the same species. Bypassing such tribalism should be one of the main goals of a future world government.
----------------------
"There is only one Latin American country with the potential to emerge as a competitor to the United States on its own right, and that is Brazil. It is the first significant, independent economic and potentially global power to develop in the history of Latin America, and it has hedged is bets nicely.
Brazil is the world's sixth largest economy and the fifth largest country both in size and in population. Like most developing countries, it is heavily oriented toward export, but its exports are well balanced. Two-thirds are primary commodities (agricultural and mineral) and the rest are manufactured products. The geographic distribution to its exports is impressive as well, with about equal amounts going to Latin America, the European Union, and Asia. A relatively small but not insignificant amount goes to the United States. This balanced export posture means that Brazil is less vulnerable to regional economic downturns than are more focused economies.
Right now Brazil is not a power that is particularly threatening or important to the United States, nor does the United States represent a challenge to Brazil. There is minimal economic friction, and geography prevents Brazil from easily challenging the United States. Brazilian expansion northward would be irrational, because the terrain to the north is extremely hard to traverse, and there is nothing to the north Brazil needs. Venezuelan oil, for instance, cannot be easily shipped to Brazil because of the terrain, and Brazil has ample supplies of its own anyway.
The only challenge that Brazil could pose to the United States would be if its economic expansion continued enough for it to develop sufficient air and naval power to dominate the Atlantic between its coast and West Africa, a region not heavily patrolled by the United States, unlike the Indian Ocean or South China Sea. This would not happen in the next decade, but as Brazilian wage rates rise, the geographical factors are such that Brazilian investments in Africa might carry lower transportation costs than investments in other parts of Latin America. Thus there would be advantages for Brazil in developing relations with sub-Saharan countries, particularly Angola, which, like Brazil, is Portuguese-speaking. This could lead to a South Atlantic not only dominated by Brazil but with Brazilian naval forces on both the Brazilian and the African coasts.
Even though Brazil is not yet in any way a threat to American interests, the underlying American strategy of creating and maintaining balances of power in all areas requires that the United States begin working now to create a countervailing power. There is no rush in completing the strategy, but there is an interest in beginning it.
In the next decade, while maintaining friendly relations with Brazil the United States should also do everything it can to strengthen Argentina, the one country that could serve as a counterweight. It should be remembered that early in the twentieth century Argentina was the major power in Latin America. Its current weakness is not inevitable. The United States should work toward developing a special relationship with Argentina in the context of a general Latin American development plan that also includes resources devoted to Uruguay and Paraguay.
This is a region where modest amounts of money now can yield substantial benefits later. Argentina's geography is suited for development; it has an adequate population and room for still more people. It has a strong agricultural base and a workforce capable of developing an industrial base. It is protected from all military incursions except those from Brazil, which should give it an incentive to play the role that the United States wants it to play.
The challenge in Argentina is political. Historically, its central government has been focused on addressing social problems in ways that actually undermine economic development. In other words, politicians tend to gain popularity by spending money they don't have. Argentina has also gone through periods of military and other dictatorships with imposed austerity, a cycle in which it does not differ fundamentally from other Latin American countries including Brazil.
The Brazilians will see a long-term threat in U.S. support for Argentina, but ideally they will be preoccupied with their own development and the internal stresses it generates, Nevertheless, the United States should be prepared for the Brazilians to offer Argentina economic incentives that would tie its economy closer to their own. Still, two factors play in the Americans' favor. First, Brazil still needs to preserve its investment capital for domestic use. Second, Argentina has long feared Brazilian dominance, so given a choice between Brazil and the United States, it will opt for the latter.
The American goal should be to slowly strengthen Argentina's economic and political capabilities so that over the next twenty to thirty years, should Brazil begin to emerge as a potential threat to the United States, Argentina's growth rivals Brazil's. This will require the United States to provide incentives for American companies to invest in Argentina, particularly in areas outside of agricultural products, where there is already sufficient investment. The United States also should be prepared to draw the American military closer to the Argentine military, but through the civilian government, so as not to incite fears that the U.S. is favoring the Argentine military as a force in the country's domestic politics.
The American president must be careful not to show his true intentions in this, and not to rush. A unique program for Argentina could generate a premature Brazilian response, so Brazil should be included in any American program, if it wishes to participate. If necessary, this entire goodwill effort can be presented as an attempt to contain Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. It will all cost money, but it will be much cheaper, in every sense, than confronting Brazil in the 2030s or 2040s over control of the South Atlantic."
- George Friedman, The Next Decade: Empire and Republic in a Changing World.
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